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Who Speaks for Neuroscience? 
Neuroimaging Evidence and 
Courtroom Expertise 
Jane Campbell Moriarty† & Daniel D. Langleben††  
“[T]hose witnesses who succeed in the marketplace for 
experts within our adversarial process will often not be those 
with the most knowledge or actual expertise in a particular 
area, but rather those whom parties believe will succeed in 
persuading the factfinder.”1 
Preface 
Professor Paul Giannelli is a leader in the scholarly field of expert 
testimony, inspiring and educating generations of judges, litigants, 
students, and fellow academics about the intersection of science and 
law and the role of expert witnesses.2 A pioneer in this interdisci-
plinary area, he has maintained an abiding focus on the importance of 
accuracy in scientific evidence and evinced an equally strong commit-
ment to justice in criminal prosecutions. To those ends, Professor 
Giannelli has written about the unfairness of criminal defendants 
shouldering the burden of proof to establish the unreliability of expert 
testimony,3 the need for independent crime labs to resolve the 
 
† Carol Los Mansmann Chair in Faculty Scholarship and Professor, 
Duquesne University School of Law. The title for this article was inspired 
by Simon A. Cole’s excellent article, Who Speaks for Science? A Response 
to the National Academy of Science’s Report on Forensic Science, 9 J.L., 
Prob., & Risk, 25 (2009). While the phrase “who speaks for science” has 
roots old and deep, Professor Cole’s article is an important comment on 
the relationship of science and law.  Professor Moriarty thanks former and 
current law students Emily Bittle, Kristin Hravnak, and Richard Bielawa, 
for their research assistance. 
†† Daniel D. Langleben, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Perelman School of 
Medicine, University of Pennsylvania. 
1. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic 
Competence, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 1009, 1011 (2008). 
2. See Paul C. Giannelli et al., Scientific Evidence (5th ed. 2013). The 
first edition of this treatise was published in 1986. 
3. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye 
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1248 
(1980) (arguing that the “prosecution in a criminal case should be required 
to establish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable 
doubt” before it is admissible evidence but that in civil cases, by 
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problem of “pro-prosecution” experts,4 the right of indigent 
defendants to have competent expert assistance,5 the perennial 
problem of junk science in criminal cases,6 and the relationship of 
legal ethics and expert witnesses.7 He has also been a good friend and 
wonderful collaborator with one of the authors of this Article.8 This 
Article is in his honor. 
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Introduction 
This Article explores the issue of proper qualifications necessary 
for expert witnesses who testify about structural and functional neuro-
imaging evidence. It outlines the nature of the problem; explains some 
of the complexity of the question of expertise as a matter of medicine, 
 
comparison, the proponent should only need to prove its validity by a 
preponderance of the evidence). 
4. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: 
The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 
439, 441 (1997) (noting that “[t]oo many experts in the criminal justice 
system manifest a police-prosecution bias, a willingness to shade or distort 
opinions to support the state’s case”); Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and 
Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific 
Research, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 53 (arguing in favor of an independent 
agency for forensic science). 
5. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance 
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305 (2004) 
(discussing the need for expert witnesses, given the widespread use of 
prosecution experts, the increase in types of experts uses, and the problems 
of fraud and error in laboratories). 
6. See Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 105 (1993); Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science and the 
Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 221 (2013). 
7. See Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and 
Expert Witnesses, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1493 (2007). 
8. Jane Moriarty is a contributing author to the Fifth Edition of Scientific 
Evidence. Giannelli et al., supra note 2.  
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science, and law, using criminal cases involving mental health as a 
helpful template to discuss the issues; provides some thoughts about 
better regulating neuroimaging evidence by focusing on the qualifi-
cations of experts; and offers modest policy suggestions to address the 
question of expert competence. 
I. Neuroscience, Neuroimaging, and Categorical 
Questions About Expertise 
Lawyers, judges, legal academics, and the media often use the 
term “neuroscience” in a general manner to describe a wide variety of 
evidence or information concerning medicine, psychology, and various 
disciplines related to the human brain, thought, and behavior.9 
Scientists, however, employ a more precise definition of “neuroscience” 
as the scientific study of the nervous system.10 The study of neuro-
science is remarkably broad, examining many species other than just 
humans, and encompasses such diverse fields as experimental neuro-
biology, cognitive science, and medicine.11 The goals and methods of 
the various neuroscience subspecialties differ widely. Those attempt-
ing to bring coherence to this transdisciplinary field note the problems 
of evaluating the epistemic value of the data, given the meth-
odological, conceptual, and theoretical diversity within and between 
the multiple disciplines.12 This multilayered complexity presents chal-
lenges for the scientific fields as well as for a legal system grappling 
with this developing field of science. 
Much of the neuroscience information admitted in court is 
generated by structural and functional brain imaging, as explained be-
low. Although neuroimaging scans are admitted into evidence in some 
cases, it is the interpretations of the scans that often provide the 
critical information, even when the scans themselves are excluded. To 
bring a bit more precision to the discussion, we will use the term 
“neuroimaging” throughout this article to describe the evidence that 
is often at issue in court. 
 
9. See generally, Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience 9 (2014) 
(providing a useful guide for the legal audience under the heading 
“Navigating Neuroscience: Who Does What?”). 
10. Boris Kotchoubey et al., Methodological Problems on the Way to 
Integrative Human Neuroscience, Frontiers in Integrative Neurosci., 
Nov. 2016, at 1, 2 (quoting About JNeurosci, JNeurosci, http:// 
www.jneurosci.org/content/about-jneurosci [https://perma.cc/D84G-TM2L] 
(last visited Mar. 2, 2018)). 
11. Id. at 4. 
12. Id. at 2. 
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One important distinction among numerous techniques used to 
image the nervous system is between “structural” and “functional” 
imaging. The former is focused on imaging the anatomical structures 
and changes that are irreversible or are slow relative to the typical 
human-behavioral changes. The latter is focused on transient and re-
versible changes in the nervous system concurrent with behavior, such 
as changes in blood flow or metabolism while pressing a button or 
attending to pictures on a screen. Common examples of structural 
imaging are X-rays, some forms of Computerized Tomography (“CT”) 
scans, and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“MRI”). Functional neuro-
imaging is represented by Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”), 
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (“SPECT”), and 
functional MRI (“fMRI”).13 While fMRI has little forensic application 
to date, PET, CT, and MRI have been regularly admitted and 
collectively constitute nearly two-thirds of the admitted neuroimaging 
evidence in criminal cases.14 
Contemporary neuroimaging research is multidisciplinary, with 
various experts contributing to an aspect of the design, implemen-
tation, and interpretation of data. Similarly, medical treatment that 
relies on neuroimaging for diagnosis and monitoring generally involves 
a team approach in which various specialized physicians and non-
physicians collaborate to order, perform, interpret, and apply the 
results of neuroimaging studies, as might occur in head injury or 
stroke. 
This interplay of specialties presents challenging questions about 
how to determine the proper qualifications for witnesses who may tes-
tify about the various aspects of neuroimaging evidence. The growth 
of neuroimaging as both an area of basic research and as a branch of 
clinical diagnostic radiology has blurred the lines between the practice 
of medicine and other areas of expertise. While a non-physician would 
not be permitted to order or interpret the results of neuroimaging 
studies in clinical practice, non-physician experts are asked to testify 
about the interpretation of CT, MRI, and PET scans in the court-
room. 
MRI and fMRI contributed greatly to the growth on neuroscience 
research involving humans, referred to as cognitive, social, and 
 
13. While Electroencephalography (“EEG”) is categorized as a type of 
functional neuroimaging, we do not include it in our discussion here. 
14. Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in the US 
Criminal Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & Bioscis. 485, 495 (2015). 
Professor Farahany’s empirical study of neuroscience and behavioral 
genetics in criminal cases indicated PET scans were involved in 18 percent 
of cases, CT in 23 percent, and MRI in 24 percent. Id. 
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systems neuroscience.15 Both types of MRI have spurred research in 
various forms of neuropathology such as traumatic, vascular, or de-
generative brain injury that previously required more invasive and 
labor-intensive nuclear medicine techniques, such as PET or SPECT. 
Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (“BOLD”) fMRI, which 
relies on endogenous changes in blood oxygenation rather than injec-
tions of contrast materials as a source of contrast, made fMRI safe to 
the point where it could be used in studies with risk-benefit ratio that 
would not justify using more invasive imaging techniques. Thus, 
BOLD fMRI was widely adopted to study basic cognitive processes, 
including behavioral regulation and impulsivity, and more complex so-
cial functions of morality, altruism, violence, and deception. This re-
search, largely conducted by non-physicians, blurred the divide 
between medical research driven by clinical questions and basic sci-
ence driven by the quest for knowledge. 
Much neuroimaging research is funded by government organ-
izations whose mission is to support science that has practical appli-
cations. As a result, neuroimaging researchers have been compelled to 
highlight the clinical relevance of even the most esoteric and cutting-
edge research in papers and grants, despite the fact that clinical ap-
plications of fMRI remain few and far between.16 Without question, 
this peer-reviewed work has significantly increased our insights into 
brain function and dysfunction.17 However, the pressure for continuous 
innovation and often-times capricious patterns of biomedical research 
funding has had negative consequences as there is little confirmation 
of these insights by replication, meta-analyses, and large scale con-
trolled clinical trials.18 
Despite the volume of functional neuroimaging studies that are 
potentially relevant to the clinical practice of psychiatry, the 
 
15. See generally Tatjana Aue et al., Great Expectations: What Can fMRI Tell 
Us About Psychological Phenomena?, 73 Int’l J. Psychophysiology 10, 
10 (2009); Peter A. Bandettini, Twenty Years of Functional MRI: The 
Science and the Stories, 62 NeuroImage 575 (2012).  
16. See S. Kapur et al., Why Has it Taken So Long for Biological Psychiatry 
to Develop Clinical Tests and What to Do About It?, 17 Molecular 
Psychiatry 1174, 1174 (2012). 
17. See generally Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can and What We Cannot 
Do with fMRI, 453 Nature 869 (2008); Peter A. Bandettini, What’s New 
in Neuroimaging Methods, 1156 Ann. N.Y. Acad. of Sci. 260 (2009). 
18. See e.g., John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are 
False, 2 PLOS Med. 124, 124 (2005); John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most 
Discovered True Associations Are Inflated, 19 Epidemiology 640, 640 
(2008); Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on 
Neuroscience, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 747, 776 
(3d ed. 2011); Aue et al., supra, note 15, at 10. 
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uncontroversial applications of functional neuroimaging in clinical 
psychiatry are limited to the diagnosis of dementia19 and pre-surgical 
mapping of the cerebral cortex. These areas are peripheral to psychi-
atry and are at its intersection with neurology and neurosurgery. 
According to the Consensus Report of the American Psychiatric 
Association Work Group on Neuroimaging Markers of Psychiatric 
Disorders in 2012, “[c]urrently neuroimaging is not recommended 
within either the U.S. or European practice guidelines for positively 
defining diagnosis of any primary psychiatric disorder.”20 This position 
is seconded by influential commentators.21 
The ongoing NIH Research Domain Criteria Project (“RDCO”) 
initiative aims to develop, for research purposes, “new ways of classi-
fying mental illnesses—based on dimensions of observable behavior 
and neurobiological measures.”22 This effort ultimately may lead to a 
new clinical classification of mental disorders to match the new 
 
19. C.f. Susan E. Rushing, Daniel A. Pryma and Daniel D. Langleben, PET 
and SPECT, in Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry 4, 20 (Joseph 
R. Simpson ed., 2012) (noting that PET is “universally accepted” for 
diagnosing dementia and other degenerative brain diseases, and for strokes 
and malignancy). 
20. Michael First et al., Consensus Report of the APA Work Group 
on Neuroimaging Markers of Psychiatric Disorders: Resource 
Document 2 (2012). 
21. See, e.g., James Giordano, Neuoroimaging in Psychiatry: Approaching the 
Puzzle as a Piece of the Bigger Picture(s), AJOB Neurosci. Oct.–Dec. 
2012, at 54 (2012); James A. Anderson & Judy Illes, Neuroimaging and 
Mental Health: Drowning in a Sea of Acrimony, AJOB Neurosci., Oct.–
Dec.  2012, at 42 (2012); Martha J. Farah & Seth J. Gillihan, The Puzzle 
of Neuroimaging and Psychiatric Diagnosis: Technology and Nosology in 
an Evolving Disipline, AJOB Neurosci. Oct.–Dec. 2012, at 31 (2012); 
Jonathan B. Savitz et al., Neuroimaging in Affective Disorders: 
Applications in Clinical Research and Forensic Psychiatry, in 
Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry 131 (Joseph R. Simpson, ed., 
2012) (recognizing that neuroimaging data with mood disorders has been 
effectively applied to a class of individuals but the “the validity of applying 
neuroimaging technology to establish the presence of illness in individual 
patients remains problematic”); Argyris Stringaris, Editorial: Neuroimaging 
in Clincal Psychiatry—When Will the Pay Off Begin?, 56 J. Child 
Psychol. & Psychiatry 1263 (2015) (posing questions and providing 
answers about the lack of progress in neuroimaging to clinical utility); 
Faisal Akram & James Giordano, Research Domain Criteria as Psychiatric 
Nosology: Conceptual, Practical and Neuroethical Implications, 26 
Clinical NeuroEthics 592 (2017). 
22. NIMH Strategic Plan for Research: Highlight: What Is RCoC?, NIMH, 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/strategic-planning-reports/highlights/ 
highlight-what-is-rdoc.shtml [https://perma.cc/WYA7-ES5S] (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2018). 
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neuroimaging research.23 However, success of this initiative and 
subsequent translation into practice is far from guaranteed.24 Much 
functional neuroimaging has great potential application for psychiatry 
and psychology and there are ongoing efforts to bridge the gap be-
tween the research and clinical practice.25 This is a critically 
important next step but one that has not yet been taken. 
A major concern for the clinical translation of neuroscience re-
search, including functional neuroimaging, is the extrapolation of 
group average data from the laboratory to individual patients in the 
clinic.26 Nonetheless, the obvious legal and social relevance of func-
tional neuroimaging research has led some to make premature 
inferences and applications from these neuroimaging data to indi-
viduals in real-life settings without sufficient support.27 And many 
courts have permitted such evidence to be admitted. 
There are four categorical concerns that courts might consider in 
determining legal expertise relating to neuroimaging evidence involv-
ing behavioral science data. The first is the proper scope of medical 
expertise with respect to neuroimaging, which generally involves such 
specialties as neurology, radiology, neuroradiology, internal medicine, 
and psychiatry. As one commentator noted when discussing the com-
plicated subspecialty boundaries of existing medicine, “[c]onsidering 
that neuroimaging technologies require specialized training in oper-
ation and interpretation, [and] assertions of expertise about the 
brain . . . questions arise as to who can speak authoritatively about 
 
23. NIMH Strategic Plan for Research: Objective 2, NIMH, https:// 
www.nimh.nih.gov/about/strategic-planning-reports/strategic-objective-2.sh 
tml [https://perma.cc/P969-NNCV] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018). 
24. See generally Kapur et al., supra, note 16. 
25. Farah & Gillihan, supra note 21, at 31; Anderson & Illes, supra, note 21, at 
42. 
26. See generally Gary B. Melton et al., Psychological Evaluations 
for the Courts: A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals 
and Lawyers (3d ed. 2007). For more on the concept of group-to-
individual application from various disciplines to be used in court, see 
David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific 
Expert Testimony, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (2014). 
27. C.C Meltzer et al., Guidelines for the Ethical Use of Neuroimages in 
Medical Testimony: Report of a Multidisciplinary Consensus Conference, 
35 Am. J. of Neuroradiology 632, 632 (2014); Rushing, Pyrma, & 
Langleben, supra note 19, at 22; Jones et al., supra note 9, at 17629; 
Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional 
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 
62 Stan. L. Rev. 1119, 1199 (2010); Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, 
Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 
Am. J.L. & Med. 377, 420 (2007). 
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the relationship between the brain and behavior . . . .”28 While a 
neuroradiologist may be well qualified to testify about a neuroimaging 
study as a diagnostic tool for a neurodegenerative disease, she may be 
less qualified than a physician who treats patients with such disease 
to address the common behaviors associated with that disease process. 
Yet, both may have sufficient qualifications to serve as expert wit-
nesses, given the breadth of a medical training. 
The second concern is the comparative types of expertise among 
the non-medical professions who may testify about neuroimaging 
evidence in behavioral science cases. Those potential experts may 
include neuroscientists, clinical psychologists, neuropsychologists, re-
search psychologists, and others, each of whom has a specific scope of 
expertise. 
The third issue involving expertise depends upon whether the 
neuroimaging evidence is based on group data generally;29 group data 
as applied to an individual;30 or individual data applied either in a 
diagnostic fashion or to explain or excuse behavior.31 While certain 
experts specializing in research may be qualified to testify about group 
data generally, those experts may not be qualified to testify about the 
diagnostic application of data to groups or more significantly, to 
individuals. Conversely, other experts, such as non-academic 
neuroradiologists, might be well-qualified to address diagnostic MRI 
 
28. Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture, and Forensic Psychiatry, 37 J. 
Am Acad. Psych. & L. 239, 241 (2009). 
29. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). All three cases 
involved the use of neuroscience data in amicus briefs to support other 
scientific and psychological evidence submitted in the case indicating that 
adolescent minds differed from adult minds in multiple ways. See, e.g., 
Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric 
Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 25–31, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) 
(Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (arguing that neuroscience suggests a possible 
physiological basis for fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
minds). For more on the various roles of neuroscience experts in the legal 
system, see Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 Nature 
Revs. Neurosci. 730 (2013). 
30. See generally Faigman et al., supra note 26; Carl E. Fisher et al., Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence: Examining the Challenges of 
Reasoning from Group Data in Psychiatry to Individual Decisions in the 
Law, 69 U. Miami L. Rev. 685 (2015); see also Manish A. Fozdar, The 
Relevance of Modern Neuroscience to Forensic Psychiatry Practice, 44 J. 
Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 145, 147 (2013) (discussing the application 
of studies in a large group to a particular case). 
31. Much neuroimaging sought to be used in court falls into this category. See 
Jane Campbell Moriarty et al., Brain Trauma, PET Scans and Forensic 
Complexity, 31 Behav. Sci. & L. 701, 708–09 (2013). 
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imaging of an individual but not qualified to testify about the design 
of fMRI studies. 
The fourth issue relating to expertise is determined by the specific 
imaging modality: Who is qualified to order, administer, and interpret 
the data? While most neuroimaging modalities are in the realm of 
medical diagnostics, as explained above, fMRI has been used largely 
in basic research often led by non-physicians in an academic setting. 
However, despite PET and MRI being in the domains of diagnostic 
radiology and nuclear medicine respectively, a variety of non-radiol-
ogists and non-physicians have relied on these modalities in research 
and have been asked to testify about interpretations of these images.32 
II. Scientific Evidence 
Courts have long wrestled with science and experts in deciding 
cases and controversies, with some degree of success but certainly 
with some notable errors.33 During the twentieth century, as scientific 
and expert evidence began to became more prominent in both civil 
and criminal litigation, many voiced concerns about the quality of 
scientific evidence admitted in the courts and the appropriate scope of 
expertise.34 These concerns precipitated the so-called Daubert trilogy 
and the amendment to Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 702.35 This 
 
32. See id. at 708, 713–14 (discussing the use of PET scan evidence to support 
claims of both traumatic brain injury and aberrant behavior not related to 
Alzheimer’s disease). 
33. Robin Feldman, The Role of Science in Law 148 (2009). 
34. For more about the mid-century critiques of scientific evidence, see 
Giannelli, supra note 3, at 1208–28. For a detailed history of scientific 
evidence, see Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert 
Testimony, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 879 (2008). 
35. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 
526 U.S. 137 (1999). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides as follows: 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to 
the facts of the case. 
	
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Who Speaks for Neuroscience? 
792 
decisional shift and rule change have been part of the ongoing effort 
“to exorcise charlatanism and differentiate good science from bad”36 in 
the courtroom; a lofty but challenging task. 
The Daubert trilogy of Supreme Court decisions governing the 
admission of expert evidence in federal cases was intended to sharpen 
courts’ focus on the quality of such evidence, requiring judges serve as 
the gatekeepers of expert evidence, sifting the evidentiary wheat from 
chaff—a daunting task for judges “largely untrained in science.”37 As 
part of this gatekeeping, courts have occasionally been guided by 
amicus briefs from groups of experts and, infrequently, by independ-
ently-retained court experts or science panels.38 Typically, however, 
courts rely on competing partisan experts, colorfully described as “the 
legal system’s [attempt] to grind truth from between the abrasive 
surfaces of two opposing parties . . . .”39 A court’s grasp of a given 
field of science and the requisite level of expertise required is often 
only as good as the messengers before them. It is a difficult task for 
courts to understand the boundaries of expertise in the area of neuro-
imaging evidence, particularly when the lawyers also may not under-
stand the proper roles of various experts. 
The use of mental health experts—currently psychiatrists and 
psychologists—to testify as experts on sanity, cognitive impairment, 
legal competence, and other matters in criminal cases has a long 
history in both U.S. courts and English common law.40 Mental health 
experts frequently testify at all stages of the criminal proceeding, from 
competency hearings through capital case penalty phase hearings to 
 
 Fed. R. Evid. 702. Sections (a)–(c) were added in 2000 to reflect the 
Daubert trilogy and other cases. Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s 
note to 2000 amendment. 
36. Golan, supra note 34, at 942. 
37. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). 
38. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Fed. R. Evid. 706(a); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. 
Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-
Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 Emory L.J. 995, 
995 (1994); see Andrew W. Jurs, Science Court: Past Proposals, Current 
Considerations, and a Suggested Structure, 15 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1, 18–23 
(2010). Improving methods for evaluating expert testimony is not a new 
concept. As Professor Tal Golan explains, nearly all the reform proposals of 
the twentieth-century are traceable back to the nineteenth century. Golan, 
supra note 34, at 937. 
39. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, supra note 29, at 732. 
40. Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and 
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 51, 75–85 
(2006); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 404–07 (1993) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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provide critical, necessary testimony.41 Yet, as long recognized, fact-
finders are skeptical of expert testimony used to explain a defendant’s 
past mental state and overwhelmingly discount the testimony of de-
fense psychiatric and psychological experts.42 Given this skepticism, 
defendants eagerly embraced functional neuroimaging to provide more 
compelling and “objective” proof of mental health impairments that 
might be regarded more favorably by juries, although questions 
remain about the relative success of such efforts.43 
III. Neuroimaging Evidence 
Over the last decade, neuroimaging evidence has become 
increasingly prevalent in criminal cases. Empirical studies demon-
strate that neuroimaging is often admitted as mitigating evidence in 
sentencing, competency hearings, and during trial as part of the 
defense.44 Courts have frequently admitted nuclear medicine-based 
studies, including PET and SPECT in criminal trials on a range of 
mental health issues, both in the guilt phase of trials and in 
 
41. The authors offer no opinion on the expertise of mental health expert 
witnesses who are testifying about matters other than structural and 
functional neuroimaging, although they recognize that there are 
contentious issues this subject also presents. Psychiatrists and psychologists 
are well-qualified to address many critical mental health matters in court. 
42. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Seeing Voices: Potential Neuroscience 
Contributions to a Reconstruction of Legal Insanity, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 
599, 613 (2016); Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable: 
The Role of Law, Science, and Speculation in Adjudicating 
Culpability and Dangerousness (2007); Michael L. Perlin, The 
Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense 144–45 (1994). 
43. See Michael L. Perlin, “And I See Through Your Brain”: Access to 
Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic 
Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 2009 
Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 4, 4; O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the 
“Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1270 
(2007). But see generally Farahany, supra note 14, at 507–08 (discussing 
the relative success of such evidence). 
44. See Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An 
Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. 
Rev. 493, 504 (2015) (discussing the use of  neuroscience evidence in the 
guilt and sentencing phases of criminal cases and noting its frequent use as 
mitigation); Farahany, supra note 14 (documenting the rising use of 
neurobiological research for purposes of competency, guilt, and mitigation); 
Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging 
Evidence in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 Drake L. Rev. 577, 661 (2016) 
(concluding that evidence has been admitted in the guilt phase, penalty 
phase, and in competency hearings). 
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sentencing,45 and fMRI expert evidence has been admitted as addi-
tional proof of psychopathy.46 While the use of such evidence may 
have promise to improve legal decision making on issues of mental 
health, the use of such evidence has been described as “haphazard, ad 
hoc, and often ill conceived.”47 
While neuroscience research has grown exponentially over the last 
decades,48 the number of publications about neuroscience and law, 
sometimes termed “neurolaw,” has also increased dramatically.49 Much 
of the academic scholarship has been devoted to questioning the 
reliability and relevance of neuroimaging evidence,50 with less 
 
45. See Nita Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 351, 374 
(2012); Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 Minn. L. 
Rev. 2036, 2064–66 (2013); Moriarty et al., supra note 31, at 708–09 
(discussing the use of PET scans as evidence in cases involving brain 
damage, toxic exposure, or illness). 
46. Virginia Hughes, Science in Court: Head Case, 464 Nature 340, 340 
(2010). For reported cases disallowing fMRI evidence related to lie 
detection, see Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2010); United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
47. Farahany, supra note 14, at 488–89. 
48. See generally Bandettini, supra note 15 (discussing the history, growth, 
and discoveries of fMRI research during the preceding twenty-year period). 
49. The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography from the website of The 
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience 
includes a graph indicating far less than 200 such publications by 2005, 
nearly 1,100 such publications by 2012, and roughly 1,700 by 2017. 
Cumulative Total of Law and Neuroscience Publications: 1984–2017, Law 
& Neurosci., http://www.lawneuro.org/bibliography/bibliography2017. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/STH9-RKH5] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018) [hereinafter 
The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography]; see also Francis X. Shen, The 
Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging Field of 
Neurolaw, 38 Int’l J. Legal Info. 352, 358 (2010). 
50. For a small sample of the scholarship, see, for example, Henry T. Greely & 
Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence 747, 776 (3d ed. 2011); The Law and 
Neuroscience Bibliography, supra note 49; Katherine Shats et al., Don’t 
Ask a Neuroscientist About Phases of the Moon: Applying Appropriate 
Evidence Law to the Use of Neuroscience in the Courtroom, 25 
Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 712, 712 (2016); C.C. Meltzer et al., 
supra note 27, at 635; Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, 
Using Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law and Research 
Policy Collide, 19 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y L. 222 (2013); Francis X. Shen & 
Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and 
Lessons, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 861, 862 (2011); Brown & Murphy, supra 
note 27, at 1131–32. 
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attention devoted to the question of expert qualifications in this 
emerging and multidisciplinary field.51 
Most of the academic analysis about functional neuroimaging evi-
dence arises from the Daubert trilogy’s focus on methods used in 
research, the relationship and distance between data and conclusions, 
and the “fit” of the proposed testimony to the issue in dispute.52 To 
date, little attention has been given to the role of expert qualifications 
in most scholarship, both because witness expertise historically has 
been a low hurdle,53 and because of the more acute concerns about 
legal reliability and the profound implications of such evidence. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the template for most state evi-
dence rules, provides that a witness may be qualified as an expert by 
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”54 Written in the 
disjunctive, the rule permits an expert to be qualified in multiple ways 
and envisions various types of expertise.55 Generally, however, there is 
 
51. Publications raising the topic of neuroimaging expertise in practice or in 
forensic settings include Purvak Patel et al., The Role of Imaging in United 
States Courtrooms, 17 Neuroimaging Clinics N. Am. 557, 560 (2007); 
Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture, and Forensic Psychiatry, 37 J. 
Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 239, 241 (2009); Elizabeth Ford & Neil 
Aggarwal, Neuroethics of Functional Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, in 
Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry: From the Clinic to the 
Courtroom 325, 331–32 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012); Andreana 
Benitez et al., Neuroimaging Training Among Neuropsychologists: A 
Survey of the State of Current Training and Recommendations for 
Trainees, 28 Clinical Neuropsychol. 600 (2014) (discussing the benefits 
neuroimaging training could have in preparing neuroscientists to serve as 
expert witnesses); Christina T. Liu, Note, Scanning the Evidence: The 
Evidentiary Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony on MRI Brain 
Scans in Civil Cases in the Post-Daubert Era, 70 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. 
Am. L. 479, 518–19 (2015). 
52. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
53. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic 
Competence, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 1009, 1016–17 (2008) (explaining that as 
a matter of historical review, judges rarely interrogated experts’ bona fides 
in a rigorous manner, and such decisions were “virtually unreviewable on 
appeal”); see also David Faigman et al., Modern Scientific 
Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 22:9 (2017–
2018 ed.) (stating that “[t]raditionally, all but the grossly unqualified 
experts were permitted to testify under Rule 702,” but noting the change 
in many post-Daubert cases where experts have been rejected on the basis 
of their lack of qualifications). 
54. See supra note 35, setting forth FRE 702. 
55. The Advisory Committee notes to FRE 702 provides:  
The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited 
merely to the “scientific” and “technical” but extend to all 
“specialized” knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a 
narrow sense, but as a person qualified by “knowledge, skill, 
	
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Who Speaks for Neuroscience? 
796 
a discernable relationship between an expert’s qualifications and 
expertise:  The more technical the specialized knowledge  and the less 
comprehensible it is to the jury, the more likely the court is to be 
demanding about qualifications.56 The nature of the expert’s opinion 
will determine the required qualifications, whether academic or ex-
periential, but it should rise to a “meaningful threshold of expertise.”57 
Recognizing that expertise is often a question of weight of the 
evidence rather than admissibility, some courts have set the bar ex-
ceptionally low for qualifications, stating that experts need only 
“possess skill or knowledge greater than the average layman.”58 Other 
courts opine that experts need to be neither “blue-ribbon practi-
tioners” with “optimal qualification[s],”59 nor even “highly qualified in 
order to testify about a given issue.”60 Despite the rhetoric, many 
courts in the post-Daubert era have employed a more rigorous stand-
ard, often in complex civil cases involving medical device and 
malpractice61 or in toxic tort cases.62 
With respect to the expert testimony of physicians, courts 
currently scrutinize qualifications for specialties and are mindful of 
limiting the testimony of experts to questions within their specialized 
medical area and knowledge.63 While non-physicians, such as nurses, 
 
experience, training or education.” Thus within the scope of the 
rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., 
physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group 
sometimes called “skilled” witnesses, such as bankers or landowners 
testifying to land values. 
 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
56. Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 Houston L. 
Rev. 743, 759 (1999), citing 2 Stephen Saltzburg et al., Federal 
Rules of Evidence Manual 1220 (7th ed. 1998). 
57. Prado Alvarez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Inc., 405 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 
2005). 
58. Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Waldorf 
v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
59. United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 262 (1st Cir. 2006). 
60. Huss v. Gaydon, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). 
61. See, e.g., Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969–74 
(10th Cir. 2001). 
62. See Faigman et al., supra note 53, § 22:9. 
63. See, e.g., Rheinfrank v. Abbott Labs., 680 F. App’x 369, 380 (6th Cir., 
2017) (noting that several courts have “limited the testimony of medical 
experts to questions within their specialized medical ken”); see also 
Mathison v. Moats, 812 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that a prison 
doctor was not qualified as an expert on cardiology); Warren v. Tastove, 
240 F. App’x 771 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding trial court decision to 
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scientists, and psychologists may be allowed to testimony about issues 
related to medicine, they are often prohibited from providing testi-
mony that is considered to be within the sole expertise of physicians.64 
Thus, medical diagnoses, medical causation, and the need for and in-
terpretation of medical tests are largely in the domain of physicians,65 
although there are exceptions.66 And the substantial overlap between 
psychiatry and psychology expertise presents complicated questions as 
well. 
 The wide-ranging pursuits of the neuroscience field include 
intersecting and often overlapping areas of expertise among psychol-
ogists, research scientists, and various categories of physicians.  Yet, 
lawyers and judges are not always aware—nor could they be—of the 
general boundaries of expertise and the precise boundaries of expertise 
in a given matter on a specific issue.  
The well-credentialed researchers producing neuroimaging data 
might seem to be qualified as experts in court, given their extensive 
knowledge of the studies, methods used, data generated, study limi-
tations, and error rates; and to the extent that is the scope of their 
testimony, they are likely well-qualified. But the analysis becomes 
difficult when one separates the question of knowledge of neuro-
imaging research from the diagnostic use of such evidence in a given 
 
exclude testimony by orthopedic surgeon on whether the plaintiff could 
resume his former vocation); Brown, supra note 56, at 766–67 (noting the 
trend toward specific expertise, but recognizing exceptions to that rule). 
64. See Carlson v. Bioremedi Therapeutic Sys., Inc., 822 F.3d 194, 200 (5th 
Cir. 2016). 
65. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 910 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 
1990) (deciding that a clinical psychologist, with “specialized training in 
the application of psychological principles to the assessment and treatment 
of people with psychological problems” was not qualified to testify about 
whether stress worsened a plaintiff’s coronary artery disease. “[He] is not a 
medical doctor, and he is not involved in making medical diagnoses or 
ordering medical studies or tests. . . [this] is a medical issue that is plainly 
beyond this witness's expertise in the field of psychology”); Kellar v. Willis, 
186 F. App’x 714 (8th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing between the practice of 
medicine and psychological expertise). 
66. Moreover, the growing reliance upon nurse practitioners, physician 
assistants, and others in medicine may well change concepts of expertise. 
For more, see Lori B. Andrews, The Shadow Health Care System:  
Regulation of Alternative Health Care Providers, 32 Houston L. Rev. 
1273 (1996) (discussing the growth and use of so-called alternative 
practitioners), and Thomas R. McLean, The Schizophrenia of Physician 
Extender Utilization, 20 Annals of Health L. 205 (2011) (discussing the 
role of physician extenders, such as nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants). 
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individual.67 Evaluating the proposed testimony vis-à-vis the matter 
at issue, i.e., the “task at hand,”68 presents difficult questions of legal 
expertise in cases involving functional neuroimaging of an individual. 
Three categories of professionals—physicians, psychologists, and 
doctoral-level research scientists—usually conduct functional 
neuroimaging research that relates to mental health issues. These 
doctoral-level scientists design the studies and oversee data collection, 
review the statistical analysis, and draft the findings, usually in the 
form of publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals. The research 
scientists may have degrees in one of many subspecialties of psychol-
ogy, a PhD in a biomedical field such as Neuroscience, Physiology, 
Chemistry, Physics, or even Computer Science and Engineering. As 
many research scientists are far removed from the actual clinical 
practice of medicine or even psychology that may employ such re-
search, their qualifications are usually insufficient to discuss the 
applicability of the research studies to an individual case. As a general 
matter, non-physician researchers are not qualified or licensed to pre-
scribe or interpret functional neuroimages diagnostically. Thus, 
application of those studies to a given individual—which is often at 
issue in legal disputes—is generally outside of their area of 
competence.69 
In the US, physicians receive a doctor of medicine (“M.D.”) 
degree from an accredited school of medicine, followed by a residency 
training in one of about thirty recognized medical specialties, such as 
radiology, and often with additional fellowship training in a sub-
specialty, such as neuroradiology.70 Physicians are licensed by a state 
to practice medicine, without distinction between specialties, so that 
from a licensing perspective, a radiologist could practice psychiatry 
without completing a residency training in psychiatry and vice versa. 
In reality, physicians are bound to practice within their specialty by 
their hospital bylaws and malpractice insurance. 
Probably the largest category of doctoral level professionals who 
engage in both neuroimaging research and clinical practice are the 
 
67. For more on the difference between diagnostic and framework expertise, 
see supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
68. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993); see also 
Giannelli, supra note 2, § 5:03, noting that an expert may be qualified in 
one aspect of a scientific technique but not qualified in another. 
69. Those scientists, however, may be well-credentialed to explain data 
generated from studies for controversies in court, as occurred with criminal 
cases involving juveniles, referenced in note 29, supra. 
70. About Us, Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., http: 
//www.acgme.org/About-Us/Overview [https://perma.cc/E54Y-UNWV] 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014). 
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clinical psychologists. Unlike research scientists, and similar to 
physicians, psychologists need to be licensed in a state in order to 
treat patients; unlike physicians, they are primarily trained in non-
pharmacological treatments71 for mental and behavioral disorders, i.e., 
psychotherapy and psychological testing. 
Of the various types of professionals involved in neuroimaging 
research, only physicians are actually licensed by a jurisdiction in 
which they practice to order a diagnostic imaging study and provide a 
diagnostic interpretation of such study, because both referral and 
interpretation constitute practice of medicine. Clinical psychologists 
are also qualified to diagnose and provide therapy to patients, and 
many are qualified to perform psychological testing of various types.72 
While clinical psychologists may rely on a physician’s interpretation 
of medical images, neither they nor research scientists are generally 
qualified to interpret those images. Thus, they could not opine wheth-
er a brain area on a PET scan using radioactive glucose tracer is ab-
normally hypometabolic and has clinical significance or requires 
medical treatment. 
There are, however, overlapping areas of expertise and differing 
opinion about the roles of psychiatrists and psychologists both in and 
out of the courtroom. As many psychological and neuroscience re-
searchers spend most of their careers using functional neuroimaging, 
they often have greater knowledge of the functional neuroimaging 
research than those practicing psychiatrists, neurologists, and radiol-
ogists who do little or no neuroimaging research. Given these comple-
mentary areas of expertise, in is not surprising that courts are not 
focusing on the distinctions among physicians, clinical psychologists, 
and research scientists. While all three specialties might be qualified 
to testify about aspects of functional neuroimaging, there are limits to 
each profession’s qualifications. 
The scope of clinical psychologist’s area of expertise has also 
become more complex over time. The American Psychological 
Association has developed a recognized subspecialty of Clinical 
Neuropsychology for doctoral-level psychologists, which raises another 
legal issue of relative spheres of expertise between clinical psychol-
ogists and neuropsychologists. However, as noted in a survey of those 
professionals, the neuroimaging training among those clinical neuro-
psychologists is widely divergent, raising further questions about what 
training constitutes sufficient courtroom qualifications to testify about 
neuroimaging.73 While the authors of that article recommend training 
 
71. Some states have begun to license psychotherapists to prescribe 
psychoactive medication. Melton et al., supra note 26, at 23. 
72. Id. at 23–24. 
73. Benitez et al., supra note 51, at 5–6.  
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in neuroimaging, they recognize that “no established guidelines exist 
for neuroimaging training among neuropsychologists.”74 Moreover, 
some of the psychologists who testify about the meaning of neuro-
images have only a masters’ level degree. Thus, there are serious 
questions about the specific qualifications that would qualify a psy-
chologist to testify about neuroimages. 
To date, some courts have allowed non-physicians to testify in a 
diagnostic fashion about structural and functional neuroimaging, gen-
erally not addressing the question of expertise. For example, in Black 
v. Bell,75 the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death.76 He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus; part of 
which rested on a claim of mental retardation pursuant to Atkins v. 
Virginia,77 which prohibits the execution of mentally retarded in-
dividuals.78 As part of his proof, the petitioner introduced the 
testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist, both of whom reviewed 
MRI and PET scans and concluded that the defendant had “extensive 
brain damage that was likely caused by his mother’s drinking alcohol 
while pregnant, but might also have been caused by other occurrences 
during his childhood.”79 The court did not comment on the relative 
qualifications of the experts but did grant defendant’s petition to 
remand on the basis of Atkins.80 
In Simmons v. State,81 two defense psychologists testified in a 
post-conviction hearing about possible mental health evidence, based 
upon a PET scan of defendant’s brain.82 One testified that the PET 
scan confirmed his opinion that the defendant had brain damage that 
led to a lifetime of impulsivity, behavioral problems, and a “sort of 
pervasive maladjustment.”83 The other testified that the PET scan 
showed “unilateral hypometabolism in a key structure in the middle 
of the brain called the thalamus,” and testified that the defendant’s 
cognitive impairment, dyslexia, impulsive behavior and acting out 
were consistent with thalamic dysfunction.84 The prosecution expert 
 
74. Id. at 8. 
75. 664 F.3d 81 (6th Cir. 2011). 
76. Id. at 82. 
77. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
78. Id. at 304. 
79. Black, 664 F.3d at 88. 
80. Id. at 101. 
81. 105 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 2012). 
82. Id. at 505. 
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
84. Id. 
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was a physician who was board-certified, i.e., residency-trained, in 
both Diagnostic Radiology and Nuclear Medicine and a Professor of 
Radiology.85 He testified that the PET scan, including the thalamus, 
was within normal range, and that PET cannot be used with any 
degree of reliability to diagnose behavioral problems.86 Perhaps para-
doxically, the court’s expressed concern about expertise only related 
to the physician testifying about behavior—without recognizing that 
the physician may have been the only one among the witnesses 
qualified to testify both about abnormalities on individual PET scans 
and their clinical significance.87 
In a federal death penalty case, the defense sought to introduce 
diagnostic testimony from an expert who was both a clinical 
psychologist and a distinguished researcher to discuss an MRI and 
PET scan as proof of the defendant’s underlying mental illness.88 The 
reliability of the PET scan evidence was challenged by the govern-
ment’s experts, one of whom was a practicing neurologist with fellow-
ship training in nuclear medicine.89 The court ultimately barred the 
PET scan evidence on reliability grounds but did not address the 
issue of whether the experts were sufficiently qualified to testify about 
PET scan evidence.90 
In another capital case, an influential research psychologist 
testified during the sentencing phase that the defendant’s fMRI re-
sults were consistent with psychopathy, based upon his extensive 
fMRI research91 and the fMRI testing of the defendant he had con-
ducted.92 Uniquely in that case, the expert testifying had a doctorate 
in both neuroscience and psychology, was a recognized expert in clini-
cal psychology involving the diagnosis of psychopathy, and had 
published extensive peer-reviewed research to correlate fMRI data 
with psychological diagnoses of psychopathy. Most experts, however, 
do not bring to the court such extensive expertise. And while such 
“blue ribbon” expertise is not the standard in courts, there should be 
better guidelines to determine who is, and who is not, qualified to 
assist the finder of fact in making a decision. 
 
85. Id. at 506. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. United States v. Montgomery. 635 F.3d 1074, 1082 (8th Cir. 2011). 
89. Id. at 1088. 
90. Id. at 1083. 
91. Hughes, supra note 46, at 340–41. 
92. Id. at 340. 
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In some cases, physicians testify about the abnormalities on PET 
scans while clinical psychologists testify about the mental health im-
plications of the neuroimages or testify that the images support their 
psychological diagnosis. While this approach avoids the non-physician 
directly evaluating a PET scan, it addresses neither the concern that 
functional neuroimages have very limited applications in clinical 
psychiatry93 nor the questions presented about non-physicians testi-
fying diagnostically about neuroimages. 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
In his 1998 article in Science, Justice Breyer states that “[t]he law 
must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically 
sound knowledge . . . . There is an increasingly important need for 
law to reflect sound science.”94 Science, law, and medicine have 
different purposes and methods and assess certainty in varying ways. 
In the courtroom they are interdependent, with clinical medicine often 
mediating between law and biological science. In the case of neuro-
imaging, the rapid growth of science has been producing new 
information faster than clinical medicine could test and learn. Medical 
and psychological training curricula may need to devote greater atten-
tion to the emerging imaging technologies even before they are 
adopted, and medical and clinical specialties need to govern their 
members about the proper role of specialization when testifying in 
court.95 
For testimony involving structural imaging such as MRI, CAT, x-
ray and nuclear medicine techniques including PET and SPECT, we 
believe that a medical degree is critical for diagnostically-based 
 
93. See Farah & Gillihan, supra note 21, at 2 (“Aside from its use to rule out 
potential medical causes of a patient’s condition, for example a brain 
tumor, neuroimaging is not used in the process of psychiatric diagnosis.”). 
94. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 Sci. 537, 
537–38 (1998). 
95. Professor Jennifer Bard explains why experts giving opinions on future 
dangerousness in capital cases do not have a data-based premise for their 
opinions, noting a lack of “peer-reviewed, published research based on a 
study of defendants who have been convicted of a capital crime and are 
facing the death penalty.” Jennifer S. Bard, Diagnosis Dangerous: Why 
State Licensing Boards Should Step in to Prevent Mental Health 
Practitioners from Speculating Beyond the Scope of Professional 
Standards, 2015 Utah L. Rev. 929, 947. She urges both American 
Psychiatric and American Psychological Associations to require state 
licensing boards to assure that these experts do not testify beyond the 
scope of medical support or evidence. Id. at 929. The authors agree that 
the licensing boards could have a strong normative effect on the scope of 
expert’s testimony. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 3·2018 
Who Speaks for Neuroscience? 
803 
expertise and a relevant subspecialty of radiology, neuroradiology or 
nuclear medicine is preferred. Professional Radiology and Nuclear 
Medicine societies anticipate that PET and SPECT scan are ordered 
and interpreted by physicians with appropriate qualifications and 
experience in the field and make no provisions for involvement of non-
physicians other than qualified technicians performing the scans.96 
With respect to fMRI, the issue is more complicated and the role 
of expertise more clouded. As noted above, with the exception of 
dementia, fMRI is not used in clinical psychiatry and the only clinical 
application of fMRI recognized by the American College of Radiology 
(“ACR”) appears to be pre-surgical mapping of brain function. Much 
of the research using fMRI is undertaken by psychologists in academic 
settings, with physicians only reviewing scans for incidental findings.97 
As fMRI is used for foundational research, the scope of  expertise for 
those researchers would likely extend to the data and interpretation of 
those research studies. 
The principles governing other forms of functional neuroimaging 
would suggest that diagnostic fMRI is in the domain of medicine. 
However, fMRI in many cases requires the patient to perform, during 
the scan, a standardized task variably referred to as “neurofunctional” 
or “activation” task that generates a motor, sensory or language 
function of interest, such as finger-tapping. According to American 
Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Current Procedural Terminology 
(“CPT”) codes created for fMRI in 2007, both physicians and clinical 
psychologists may administer and interpret fMRI studies that involve 
such “neurofunctional testing.”98 This suggests that the AMA CPT 
panel considers these two professions interchangeable in at least some 
parts of the fMRI domain. However, since this CPT is intended for 
 
96. See ACR Practice Parameter for Performing and Interpreting Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI), Am. C. Radiology (2017), https://www. 
acr.org/-/media/ACR/Files/Practice-Parameters/mr-perf-interpret.pdf?la= 
en [https://perma.cc/TU53-67GD]; ACR-ASNR-SPR Practice Parameter 
for the Performance and Interpretation of Magnetic Resonance Imaging of 
the Brain, Am. C. of Radiology (Res. 6–2013) https://www.acr.org/-
/media/ACR/Files/Practice-Parameters/mr-brain.pdf?la=en [https://perma. 
cc/2XMG-5GW2]; The SNM Procedure Guideline for General Imaging 
V6.0, Soc’y Nuclear Med. (2010), http://interactive.snm.org/docs/ 
General_Imaging_Version_6.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM6M-W4KS]. 
97. For more on issues related to incidental findings from MRI and fMRI 
studies, see Kyoko Takashima et al., Discovery and Informing Research 
Participants of Incidental Findings Detected in Brain Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Studies: Review and Multi-Institutional Study, Brain & Behav., 
May 2017. 
98. John Hart, Jr., M.D., et al., Clinical Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, 20 Cognitive Behavioral Neurology 141, 141–44 (2007). 
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brain mapping prior to surgery,99 this does not indicate a general 
endorsement of non-physicians ordering or interpreting fMRI of indi-
viduals outside of recognized medical indications.  
For their part, the courts’ analysis of functional neuroimaging 
would be helped if they had a clearer understanding of the academic 
and professional structure of the interrelated fields that produce the 
neuroimaging science. While courts will continue to rely on the 
“dueling experts” model, we believe that there are additional routes to 
provide scientific and medical guidance to the courts, including the 
use of consensus opinions by professionals in the various fields. 
As a result of the Daubert trilogy, The Reference Manual on 
Scientific Evidence, the many programs presented on Science for 
Judges, the Supreme Court’s encouragement to appoint independent 
experts,100 and the proposed use of Science Panels for complex liti-
gation,101 there has been much effort to improve the communication 
between science, medicine, and law. But as is widely agreed, most of 
these suggested methods to improve the communication have not been 
as successful as hoped. There is more to be done. 
 Another critical way to help bridge the divisions among science, 
medicine and law is greater reliance upon practice guidelines of the 
relevant professional groups, such as the AMA, the American 
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the 
ACR, and the Society of Nuclear Medicine (“SNM”), as well as 
recommendations by specially convened conferences such as the 
Consensus Report of the Working Group on Psychiatry.102 
With hope, this trend will continue. When experts can reach 
consensus on a variety of issues, courts are provided with 
epistemically competent information by which to evaluate the experts 
in their courtrooms. There should be greater discussion among 
psychiatric and psychological societies on the role of functional 
neuroimaging for mental health-related issues. Such a collaboration 
would be of great use to the courts and could improve the quality of 
judicial gatekeeping with respect to expertise.  
 
 
99. Id. at 144. 
100. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) 
(stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence have a “permissive backdrop” 
for expert testimony); Fed. R. Evid. 706. 
101. Jurs, supra, note 38, at 18–19. 
102. We also echo Professor Bard’s suggestion that licensing bodies could have 
more input into overseeing the proper limits of expert witness testimony. 
